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Contrasting Trends in Firm Volatility: Theory and Evidence 
David Thesmary Mathias Thoenigz
Abstract
Over the past decades, the real and nancial volatility of listed rms has increased, while the
volatility of private rms has decreased. We rst provide panel data evidence that, at the rm level,
sales and employment volatility are impacted by changes in the degree of ownership concentration.
We then construct a model with private and listed rms where risk taking is a choice variable
at the rm-level. Due to general equilibrium feedback, we nd that an increase in stock market
participation or integration in international capital markets generate opposite trends in volatility
for private and listed rms. This pattern cannot be replicated by alternative comparative statics
exercises, such as an increase in product market competition, an increase in product market size,
an increase in the fraction of listed rms, or a decrease in aggregate volatility.
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, the idiosyncratic volatility of publicly listed US rms has risen considerably, be
it computed from real or nancial variables.1 Existing explanations focus on product market competi-
tion.2 Indeed the US, like many other countries over the past thirty years, have experienced profound
deregulation of many industries, a dramatic increase in international competition, and an accelera-
tion in the pace of innovation on product markets. Yet privately held rms experienced the opposite
movement. In a recent paper, Davis et al (2006) show that employment growth volatility of non listed
rms has decreased by about 50% between the early 1980s and the late 1990s. In our French census
data, we nd similar evolutions (see gure 1). The volatilities of listed and private rms have evolved
in opposite directions, a fact that competition-based theories cannot explain.
This paper proposes an explanation for these contrasting trends. Our starting point is that, at
the rm level, risk taking is a choice variable which is a¤ected by risk sharing among shareholders
This paper is a deeply revised version of Financial Market Development and The Rise in Firm Level Uncertainty.
We thank Juuso Valimaki and three referees for their decisive input, as well as Nicolas Coeurdacier, Philippe Martin,
Thomas Philippon and Romain Rancière for their comments on this new version.
yHEC Paris and CEPR. Email: thesmar@hec.fr
zUniversity of Geneva and CEPR. Email: thoenig@ecopo.unige.ch
1Campbell et alii (2000) nd that the volatility of stock returns, after ltering out aggregate shocks, has been multiplied
by four. Brandt et alii (2007) argue that this trend disappears when they include the more recent period of volatility
decrease. Their study, however, stops in 2005. When more recent years (and months) are included, the trend reappears.
The 10 year rolling standard deviation of sales or employment growth has doubled between 1955 and 2000 (Comin and
Philippon, 2005, Irvine and Ponti¤, 2007). Compared to the 1950s, industry leaders are now three times more likely to
lose their preeminence.
2See Thesmar and Thoenig (2000), Comin and Philippon (2005), Gaspar and Massa (2006), Irvine and Ponti¤ (2007).
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(Helpman and Razin, 1978, Saint-Paul, 1993, Obstfeld, 1994). Recently the degree of risk sharing
among owners of listed rms has risen dramatically because of increased stockmarket participation
(Guiso et alii, 2002), rise in institutional ownership (French, 2008), and international capital market
integration (Chari and Henry, 2004). Against this background, publicly listed rms have taken on
more operating risk by adopting ambitious, but risky, projects. This could explain the pattern of
rising volatility for listed rm. But could this lead to a decrease in volatility of privately held rms?
Our theoretical analysis addresses this question.
To this purpose, we provide a model of endogenous risk taking by listed and private rms in the
presence of aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty.3 Listed rms are owned by di¤used shareholders
(the "investors"), while private rms have only one owner (the entrepreneur) who therefore bears
all of idiosyncratic risk. Even though they have fully distinct shareholders, listed and non listed
rms interact in our model: they compete on the labor market, and on product markets segmented
à la Dixit Stiglitz. In this setup, our main comparative static exercise relates to a increase in stock
market participation: Following an exogenous increase the number of investors, we show that investors
e¤ective tolerance to risk increases and public rms respond by becoming more volatile and, on
average, more productive. The demand for production factors increases and this props up factors real
prices. This impacts negatively the prots of privately held rms and entrepreneurs become poorer.
Since entrepreneurs have decreasing absolute risk aversion,4 their risk tolerance decreases and private
rms reduce their risk taking. To sum up, an increase in stock market participation generates two
constrasting trends in rm volatility.
To gain tractability, we then study a log-linearised version of our model, assuming small aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks. This approach allows us to show that in spite of constrasting changes in
their volatilities, listed and private rms both experience a drop in their real prots : even though
listed rms become more e¢ cient on average, competition prevents them from passing these gains to
their shareholders. We also nd that the utilities of investors and private entrepreneurs declines while
workersutilities go up.
Finally, we use our approximated model to generate additional comparative statics, such as an
increase in the number of listed rms, or a decrease in aggregate uncertainty. In our model, none of
these alternative comparative statics generate the dual trend in rm volatility that we seek to explain.
In our last extension, we also study the impact of international capital market integration. We do this
3 In our model risk taking a¤ects the rm-level demand curve only. It is clear that risk taking also a¤ects the rm-level
supply curve. From a theoretical perspective, both channels deliver very similar results and we thus choose to consider
only the rst channel. As a consequence our anlaysis remains silent on productivity evolution. However it is clear that
our theoretical mechanism and our empirical results are perfectly compatible with the technology view elaborated in
Comin and Mulani (2005) and Comin and Philippon (2005) (who show that sales per worker growth has also experienced
an increase in volatility for listed rms).
4We assume that agents have CRRA utility in nal consumption.
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because nancial integration is viewed by some economists as a more signicant source of risk sharing
among investors than stock market participation (see discussion in Guiso et al, 2003). For instance,
Chari and Henry (2004) show that stock markets liberalizations increase stock prices by about 15%,
of which 6.8% can be attributed to improved risk sharing. To this purpose we extend our baseline
model to the case with two countries and imperfectly correlated aggregate shocks. We nd that capital
market integration, by enhancing risk sharing among investors, is able to generate contrasting trends
in rm volatility.
Beyond providing an unied rationale behind the opposite trends in rm volatility, our model also
contributes to the literature on rm risk taking and capital market development (Saint-Paul, 1993,
Obstfeld, 1994, Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997, Perroti and Von Thadden, 2006) in several ways. First,
we augment existing models by introducing rms that do not access capital markets and explicitly
model imperfect competition. Our model, in contrast to Saint-Paul (1993) or Obstfeld (1994), does
not have the unsettling property that countries with more developed, or integrated, nancial markets,
should display more aggregate output uncertainty (but less income uctuations) as they specialize: it
is a well established fact that more developed economies have lower GDP growth volatility (see Koren
and Tenreyro, 2008 for a discussion).
Before developing the model, we present in Section 2 some suggestive evidence on French data.
Like Davis et al (2006), we nd evidence of opposite trends in idiosyncratic volatility: the volatility of
listed rms increases strongly, while the volatility of non listed rms declines. We also provide micro-
level evidence that rms with more diversied shareholders tend to become more volatile. Given
the inuence of the theories referred to above, such evidence is surprisingly lacking in the empirical
literature, apart from very few papers. Using a sample of publicly listed rms, Sraer and Thesmar
(2007) nd that family rms are less volatile than non family rms. In their sample of privately held
Italian companies, Michellacci and Schivardi (2008) nd that the dispersion of productivity is smaller
among family rms, a fact that they interpret as indicative of lower volatility. Such existing evidence
is cross sectional only and is therefore subject to strong omitted variable biases. Here we exploit the
panel dimension which allows us to identify the within rm correlation between changes in shareholder
concentration and changes in rm level volatility. This allows to test our core theoretical assumption,
namely that risk taking is a decision variable at the rm level and depends on the degree of ownership
concentration.
The rest of the paper is devoted to the theoretical analysis. In Section 3, we present the closed
economy model and derive some comparative static properties. In Section 4, we make the assumption
that aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are small, and linearize the model: it allows us to present
additional properties of the equilibrium and comparative statics. In Section 5, we present the linearized
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model with capital market integration. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Firm Level Volatility: Trends and Determinants
This Section presents supporting evidence based on French data. We describe our data in Section 2.1
and provide evidence on the opposite trends of volatility for listed and private rms in Section 2.2.
Finally in Section 2.3 we successfully test the mechanism at the core of our theory by showing that,
in the panel dimension, a decrease in ownership concentration is accompanied by an increase in rm
level idiosyncratic volatility.
2.1 Data
Our sample is composed of all French rms, active at some point between 1984 and 2004, that (i) were
never state owned5 and (ii) whose total sales exceed 30 million euros or whose labor force exceeds
500 employees, at least three years during the period. Each of these rms is tracked throughout the
period. This leads to an unbalanced panel of all large and many medium sized businesses in the French
economy, be they privately held or publicly listed.
For all these rms, information is gathered from two sources: accounting and ownership data.
Accounting data come from tax les used by the Ministry of Finance to collect the corporate tax
(BRN data), available from 1978 to 2004. The BRN data represents the universe of all French rms
with more than 1 million euros of annual turnover. In terms of variables, BRN provides us with the
balance sheet, prot statement and employment of these rms. This data source is used to construct
three variables: the 4 digit industry, total employment, total turnover. We end up with 148,789
observations (some 5,722 rms per year), corresponding to 9,294 di¤erent rms since there is both
entry to and exit from the sample.
Ownership information are obtained from the Financial Relation Survey (LIFI in French), con-
ducted each year from 1984 to 2004 by the French Statistical o¢ ce. Only 64,275 observations (some
3,200 rms per year) can be found in LIFI. From this survey we build two variables. The rst one,
LIST, is a dummy equal to 1 when the rm belongs to a publicly listed business group, or is itself
listed on the French stock market. For business group membership, we dene as the group leader, the
rm that owns, directly or indirectly, at least 50% of a given rms equity. It is retrieved using LIFI
survey and, for indirect ownership, an algorithm developed at the statistical o¢ ce. We then checked,
by hand, whether, each year between 1984 and 2004, the rm itself or its group leader, was listed on
the French stock market. In our 1984-2004, sample, such directly or indirectly listed rms make up
13% of all observations which corresponds on average to 815 rms out of 5,972 rms each year. Most
5This screen automatically removes privatized rms.
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of these rms are indirectly listed through their group leader.
Our second variable based on the LIFI survey is the INDIV dummy which measures ownership
concentration. From LIFI, we get for each rm, the fraction of equity that is held by: (i) French
individual; (ii) foreign individuals; (iii) French rms; (iv) foreign rms; (v) employees; (vi) the state;
and (vii) by unknowncompanies or persons. INDIV is equal to 1 when the self reported fraction of
equity held by French individuals lies above 50%. This variable is not always reported, so the number
of observations for which we have such information is 64,275 (3,213 obs per year). Given that the
survey LIFI asks for ownership by known individuals, which cannot be too numerous, we believe
that INDIV captures properly the set of rms that are controlled by a restricted set of shareholders.
2.2 Trends in Firm Level Volatility
Our rst measure of rm level volatility, rolvol it; is the rolling standard deviation of sales growth as
standardly used in the literature6. For rm i at date t, with a growth rate of git; we compute:
rolvol it =
1
10
t0=t+5X
t0=t 4
(git0)
2  
 
1
10
t0=t+5X
t0=t 4
git0
!2
This measure requires the rm to be present for 10 years in a row, from 4 years before t, until 5 years
after t. Moreover, our census data containing outliers due to hand-typing errors, mergers, and the
presence of smaller, more volatile rms, we trim extreme values of rolvol it. Last, we compute for each
year the mean of rolvol it separately for the groups of listed and non listed rms. The time evolution
of these two gures are reported in Figure 1. The volatility of listed rms increases from 15% to 18%,
while the volatility of non listed rms declines by about 1%. While there is a pattern of opposite
trends in our French data, the trends are smaller than what is reported in the US-based study by
Davis et alii. One possible reason is that we use rm-level data while Davis et alii (2006) exploit plant
level data. Plants being sub-units of rms, they are signicantly more volatile (two times more volatile
in Davis et aliisample). Another issue with rolvol it is potential contamination by aggregate volatility
whose declining trend may mask changes in idiosyncratic volatility in our French data. Those concerns
lead us to consider an alternative measure of rm volatility.
Our second measure of volatility is rmsreaction to industry shocks. Based on the methodology
developed by Thesmar and Thoenig (2007) and Sraer and Thesmar (2007) we estimate the following
6For recent empirical studies using this kind of rolling window measure, see Comin and Philippon (2005), Comin and
Mulani (2006) and Davis et alii (2006). More generally the literature has used two di¤erent measures of rm volatility: i/
with the standard deviation of the time series performance of a rm over a (rolling) window; ii) with the cross-sectional
dispersion of rm performance across rms. The evolution of these two measures may in principle be di¤erent. The time
series volatility measure is better in that it removes the average growth rate of the rm and hence eliminates the bias in
the evolution of rm volatility caused by a change in the distribution of the rms growth potential.
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model, for rm i, in industry s at date t:
log sales ist = i + it: log sales ist +Xit + "it (1)
under the constraint that it; the time-varying sensitivity to industry sales, is conditioned on LIST it
, the listing status of rm i over the period
it =
T=2004X
T=1984
PT :1ft=Tg  (1  LIST it) +
T=2004X
T=1984
LT :1ft=Tg  LIST it (2)
where sales ist is the sum of sales in industry s (excluding rm i);. Xit are control variables; i is a
rm xed e¤ect; and the coe¢ cients (PT ; 
L
T ) capture the time evolution of it for private and publicly
listed rms.
We estimate (1)-(2) using OLS, including year dummies interacted with LIST it as the controls
Xit. Results are reported in Figure 2 where the time evolution of (PT , 
L
T ) are represented. For listed
rms, the sensitivity to industry shocks goes from 0.05 to 0.15 over the period, while it decreases from
0.17 to 0.01 for non listed rms. The opposite trends of volatility between the two groups of rms is
very large in our data when measured through this method.7
2.3 Ownership Concentration and Firm Level Volatility
We test now the impact of ownership concentration on volatility. In order to circumvent omitted
variable biases, we exploit the panel dimension of our dataset. We rst use our measure of rms
reaction to industry shocks. We thus estimate equation (1) but instead of imposing (2), we assume
now that it is conditioned on ownership concentration:
it = + :INDIV it + : log(sales it) + s + "it (3)
where INDIVit is the dummy variable described above, equal to 1 when the rm reports that known
individualsown at least 50% of the equity;  is a constant term and s is a two digit industry dummy
and "it is an error term clustered at the rm level. Results are reported in Table 1, where columns
1-3 focus on sales reactions, while columns 4-6 focus on employment reactions to industry shocks.
Comparing the results in columns 1 and 4 where we impose  = s = 0 in equation (3), to the results
in columns 2 and 5, it appears that the sensitivity of sales and employment to shocks is lower for rms
with concentrated ownership. It decreases from 0.09 to 0.02 for the sensitivity of sales, and from -0.12
to -0.18 for employment. In columns 3 and 6 we further control for industry and size e¤ects by rst
regressing INDIVit on log(salesit) and the s, and then interacting the residual with industry shocks.
We nd the same order of magnitude.
7This divergence is strongly statistically signicant, when for instance we impose the T to follow di¤erent trends and
test for equality.
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There are limitations to the above approach. First, it does not identify properly employment
dynamics which are negatively correlated with sales shocks in the data; probably because it fails to
account for the inertia in employment. Second, and most importantly, this approach does not allow to
include rm xed e¤ects in equation (3). This requires to nd an alternative measure for idiosyncratic
volatility which varies, at the rm level, in the time-dimension. To this purpose we implement a recent
methodology developed in Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) and Castro, Clementi and MacDonald
(2008) which proxies volatility with the absolute deviation to conditional expected sales growth.
In a rst stage we run the following regression, for rm i at date t:
sales it   sales it 1
sales it 1
= i + :INDIV it + t + "it (4)
where sales growth is the left hand side variable i is a rm xed e¤ect and t is year dummy designed
to capture aggregate volatility. We use our OLS estimate of (4) to retrieve jb"itj, the absolute deviation
of sales growth from its conditional mean.
In a second stage we estimate the following equation:
jb"itj = i + :INDIV it + t + it (5)
where i is a rm xed e¤ect; t is a year dummy; and it is an error term that we allow to be
correlated across observations of a same rm.
OLS estimates of various forms of equation (5) are reported in Table 2. Panel A uses the estimate
of sales growth volatility, while panel B reproduces the exercise for employment growth. In both cases,
growth rates are windsorized prior to running regression (4). The specication in column 1 (panels
A and B) is estimated without the rm xed e¤ect i in equation (5); the estimated coe¢ cient 
is statistically signicant at the 1% threshold for sales volatility and 5% threshold for employment
volatility; in both cases the coe¢ cient is negative and this shows that in the cross section of rms,
a concentrated ownership impacts negatively volatility. The e¤ect is economically sizeable. For sales
growth volatility, the sample mean of jb"itj is 10.7 basis points and the coe¢ cient  equal to -1.7. Hence,
the mean idiosyncratic volatility in sales growth is lower by some 15% for rms with a concentrated
ownership. The e¤ect is around 10% for employment volatility. This relation is consistent with
Michelacci and Schivardi (2008) who nd in their Italian data that the dispersion of productivity
growth is smaller for family rms than for non family rms.
In column 2, for panels A and B, the rm xed e¤ects i are included: in that case, the  coe¢ cient
is identied on rms that transit between the state INDIVit = 1 (being controlled by individuals)
and the state INDIVit = 0. On the cross-sectional sample of 2,254 rms (60,120 obs.), only 350 rms
change of INDIVit over the period. In spite of this demanding identication strategy, these panel
estimates are statistically signicant. With respect to the cross sectional specication of column 1,
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the estimated coe¢ cient  is now reduced by three times for sales growth volatility but is unchanged
for employment volatility. Finally, in column 3, we control for rm size by including log(salesit) in
equation (5). Our panel results are not a¤ected.
These panel results o¤er supporting evidence to our core theoretical assumption, namely that risk
taking is a decision variable at the rm level and depends on the degree of ownership concentration.
3 The Baseline Model
In this section, we present the baseline model and derive some general properties.
3.1 Set-Up
We consider a static economy populated by eL workers, each of them supplying one unit of labor. A
measureN of rms compete imperfectly on the product market: NL rms are listed on the stockmarket
while each of the remaining NP  N NL rms are held by a single entrepreneur, who does not supply
labor. Among the eL workers, there are I investors who trade the stocks of listed rms with each other.8
There are two sources of risk: an idiosyncratic shock on rm-level demand and an aggregate supply
shock on labor supply. There are three periods9. At date 1, each rm i implements a strategy si that
indirectly a¤ects the mean and variance of future prots. At date 2, investors trade stocks and the
nancial market clears. At date 3, uncertainty is revealed; the product and the labor markets clear;
the workers receive wages; rm owners (investors or entrepreneurs) receive the prots.
3.1.1 Preferences and Technology
Each agent k in the economy has a utility U(Ck) with constant10 relative risk aversion  > 0: The
consumption index Ck is a composite of the consumptions yk;i of goods supplied under monopolistic
competition by rms i 2 [0;N ]: Ck =
R N
0
~
1=
i y
( 1)=
k;i di
=( 1)
where   2 by assumption.11 The
random coe¢ cients ~i > 0 correspond to good i specic demand shifter. A convenient feature of this
Dixit Stiglitz index is that aggregating individuals consumptions is simple in spite of heterogeneity
in individual incomes between the three groups of agents populating this economy (pure workers,
entrepreneurs, investors). Indeed the total demand ~yi addressed to each monopoly i is obtained
8For expositional simplicity we assume that entrepreneurs do not supply labor. Relaxing this assumption does not
a¤ect our results.
9 Inverting period 1 and period 2 would not change the result.
10Most of our results are robust to assuming a DRRA utility.
11 In our theory, the assumption  > 2 is crucial because it forces our main aggregate variable M to positively depend
on rm level decisions (see equation (9)). This assumption is fully consistent with the empirical estimates of the elasticity
of substitution based on microdata (Head and Ries 2001; Broda and Weinstein 2006) and with recent estimates based on
macro data (Imbs and Méjean 2008). Moreover it is now standard in the macro literature with heterogenous industries
or rms (as it is the case in our model) to calibrate  with values above 4 (for recent examples, see Atkeson and Burnstein
(2008), Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008) ).
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by aggregating consumptions yk;i over the whole population and standard computations lead to :
~yi = ~iEP
 1=pi , where pi is the monopoly price charged by rm i, E 
R eL+NP
0 Ekdk is the aggregate
nominal expenditure and P is a price index equal to: P 
R N
0
~j :p
1 
j dj
1=1 
:
On the supply side, we assume that the total number of workers is random and equal to eL = eAL
where ~A is positive with mean 1 and variance 2A. We interpret eA as an aggregate supply shock.12
Each rm i hires li workers at nominal wage w, and produces according to the constant returns to
scale technology yi = li. We implicitly rule out entry on the product market by xing exogenously13
the number of rms at N .
3.1.2 Strategies of Firms
At date 1, each rm i implements a strategy si  0 at a cost C(si) in real terms, which a¤ects its
demand shifter ~i in the following way14:
~i = 1 + si ~di (6)
where ~di are i.i.d. positively distributed shocks with mean 1 and variance 2d: The cost function C(:)
is increasing, convex with C(0) = C 0(0) = 0 and C 0(1) =1. For private rms, the optimal strategy
si maximizes entrepreneurs expected utility; for listed rm, it maximizes the date 2 stock price.
Assumption (6) is motivated by the literature on growth and nance (see for instance Saint-Paul
(1993), Obstfeld (1994), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)). In existing theories, enhanced risk sharing
reduces the costs of risk taking for the representative rm, which has the e¤ect of increasing the
volatility of aggregate output. Hence, nancially developed and integrated economies should be more
volatile, which is a counterfactual prediction (Koren and Tenreyro, 2008). In our model, this does
not happen (see section 3.2.1). Moreover our view of risk taking is precisely microfounded with rm
level demands. Here the strategies si can be interpreted as a choice of customization by the rm.
Customized goods can be highly valuable, but their demand is di¢ cult to predict because of erratic
preferences. This interpretation is close to the view developed in standard models of advertising
(Schmalensee 1974), in models with consumer inertia (Fishman and Rob (2003)) and in Piore and
Sabel (1984)s vision of exible manufacturing.
12An alternative modelization would be to take eA as a productivity shock. This does not change the heart of the
analysis but makes exposition more complex. Moreover we assume that for all eA we have eAL > I: Hence the number of
investors is not a¤ected by aggregate uncertainty.
13 In an unreported extension of the model (available upon request from the authors) we endogenize N: In that case,
the mechanisms are similar except that now the general equilibrium feedback is channelized by N rather than by M:
14All our results can easily be generalized to any functional form ei = G(si; edi) such as G(:; :) is positive, increasing
and quasi concave in both arguments with the following log-supermodularity condition: @2 logG=@si@ edi > 0.
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3.2 Solving the model
We solve this model backwards, starting with labor and product market clearing conditions in period
3; stock trading in period 2, and strategy choice in period 1.
3.2.1 Product and Labor Market Equilibria
At date 3, the aggregate labor supply shock eA and nal demand shocks edi are revealed15. Each
rm i charges an optimal monopoly price pi in order to maximize its prots in real terms ~i =
~yi(pi   w)=P   C(si): As it is standard in this monopolistic competition setting, N is assumed to be
su¢ ciently large such that the marginal e¤ect of pi on the price index P is negligible. Solving this
standard maximization problem leads to a constant markup over marginal cost pi = w=(1  1=) and
a labor demand li = ~iEw P  1: Aggregating labor demands across rms and using the denition
of P we get the labor market clearing condition ~AL = (1   1=)E=w: This yields the real wage
w=P = (1 1=)(R N0 ~jdj)1=( 1) and the real spending E=P = ~AL(1 1=)(R N0 ~jdj): Together with
(6) we then obtain real prots at equilibrium
~i =
~A
M

1 + si ~di

  C(si) (7)
whereM  (=L)
R N
0
~jdj
( 2)=( 1)
:We labelM the degree ofmarket pressure because it measures
the extent to which labor market pressure feedbacks on real wage and rm prots. Indeed, using the
denition of M; we can rewrite the real wage as an increasing function of M :
w=P = !M
1
 2 (8)
where ! is a combination of exogenous parameters equal to !  (1  1=)(L=)1= 2:
The interpretation of the negative impact of M on prots in equation (7) is the following: When
all rms face very high demand shocks ej , aggregate demand for labor is high; this props up real wage
and this reduces prots16.
Noticing that the shocks ~dj are i:i:d, the law of large numbers leads to the following formula for
M :
M =

L
N
 2
 1

1 +
NP
N
sP +
NL
N
sL
 2
 1
(9)
15The shocks are assumed to be independent: this simplies drastically the analysis. In reality, however, shocks are
correlated in non-trivial ways. Schumpeterian dynamics leads some rms to win at the same time as others loose. Franco
and Philippon (2006) nd evidence on this. This negative correlation of shocks is also at the root of the mechanisms
that Comin and Mulani (2005) use to link rm volatility with aggregate volatility.
16 In fact, this e¤ect competes with another force: due to Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, larger ej by competitors increases
real spending E=P and prots for all rms. This second e¤ect is however dominated under our assumption that the
elasticity of substitution is large enough (ie:  > 2).
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where (sP ; sL) correspond to the risky strategies for private and listed rms respectively. Note that
all rms within each group are identical and therefore adopt identical strategies.
From the previous computations we get the relationship between (sP ; sL) and volatility. Indeed,
from the labor demand, we get the size adjusted volatility of sales at the rm level:
var (yi)
E2 (yi)
= 2A + 
2
d
(1 + 2A)
(1 + 1=si)2
(10)
which is increasing in si.This formula allows us to interpret si as a measure of risk taking at the rm
level. With respect to aggregate volatility we look at the size-adjusted volatility of real spending E=P ;
simple computations show that this does not depend on (sP ; sL) and is always equal to A. Hence,
our model makes no prediction on the evolution of aggregate volatility.
3.2.2 Stock Trading and Prices
At date 2, each investor initially owns a potentially unbalanced portfolio of NL=I shares of listed
rms. Stock trading allows her to rebalance optimally her portfolio.17 All listed rms being ex-ante
symmetric, their equilibrium holding of each stock is exactly 1=I: The Euler condition of the underlying
portfolio choice problem leads to the following standard expression for the stock price of rm i:
i = E
h
U 0( ~RI)eii =E hU 0( ~RI)i (11)
where ~RI is date 3 real income of the representative investor (all investors are identical). It is made
of the real wage and the dividends paid by stocks owned: ~RI = w=P +(1=I)
R NL
0 ejdj: Taking (7) and
(8) and NL being large, we get:
~RI = !M
1
 2 +
NL
I
h
~A (1 + sL) =M   C(sL)
i
(12)
The investor real income can be decomposed into labor income and nancial income. A larger aggregate
supply shock ~A increases nancial income while market pressure M increases the labor component
but decreases the nancial component. The nancial income is una¤ected by idiosyncratic demand
shocks ~di because of e¢ cient risk diversication through the stockmarket.
3.2.3 Strategy Choice of Privately Held Firms
We rst analyze the strategy choice of private rms. The date 3 real income of the entrepreneur
owning private rm i is equal to:
~RE;i = ~A(1 + si ~di)=M   C(si) (13)
17The safe investment is assumed non tradable to simplify exposition.
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Entrepreneurs do not supply labor and their income ~RE;i corresponds to the prots of their rm. It
is a¤ected by the idiosyncratic shock ~di because the entrepreneur is underdiversied.18 At date 1 the
entrepreneur chooses her optimal strategy sp taking the expected market pressure M as given so as
to maximize her expected utility sp = argmaxsi E
h
U( ~RE;i)
i
: Omitting the index i; the rst order
condition of this problem can be rewritten as:
C 0(sp) =
1
M
+ cov
"
U 0( ~RE)
EU 0( ~RE)
;
~A:ed
M
#
(14)
The optimal sP equalizes the LHS marginal cost of risk taking to the RHS marginal benet of risk
taking. Benet is composed of the marginal increase in expected income, i:e: E( ~A:ed=M) = 1=M ,
corrected for the marginal increase in risk exposure. This risk correction term is negative because
the marginal increase in revenue, ~A:ed=M; is negatively correlated with marginal utility, U 0( ~RE): a
marginal increase in s is less desirable for a risk averse entrepreneur than for a risk neutral one,
because it generates the most income when it is the least needed. We show in appendix A.2 that the
LHS (resp. RHS) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in s such that there is one and only one interior
solution to equation (14). It is in general not possible to nd a closed form solution for sP except in
a CARA-gaussian framework. Yet we can infer the following partial equilibrium property:
Lemma 1 Risk Taking by private rms, sP , is a decreasing function of Market Pressure, M
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The RHS of (14) highlights how market pressure M impacts the marginal benet of risk taking
and consequently the optimal sP . The overall e¤ect results from three counterbalancing forces. First,
an increase in M reduces the expected marginal benet of raising sP ; this tends to decrease sp. The
second e¤ect goes in the opposite direction: entrepreneur real income being in eA=M , an increase in
M smooths prots across states of nature and reduces the elasticity of income to risk; this reduces
the magnitude of the (negative) risk exposure term and this increases sP . Last, a larger M reduces
real income and therefore, utility being CRRA, this increases absolute risk aversion; this tends to
decrease sp. Lemma 1 shows that the rst and third e¤ects dominate the second. Interestingly, it is
also possible to show that when the third e¤ect is absent (ie. assuming CARA utility), the second
e¤ect dominates the rst e¤ect, such that an increase in M tends to increase sP : in that case there
is no reasonable comparative static exercise which is able to generate a pattern of diverging trends in
volatility for private and listed rms.19 Hence, the assumption that absolute risk aversion is decreasing
18For instance, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) provide evidence of entrepreneurial underdiversication. They
document that owners of private stock in the Survey of Consumer Finances place on average half of their wealth in private
stocks, most of it corresponding to a single, actively managed rm (see their Table 2, p. 751).
19For the analytical results derived in such a CARA-gaussian setup, see Thesmar and Thoenig (2006). Moreover
existing evidence from the experimental and empirical literature shows that the assumption of constant absolute risk
aversion is not empirically relevant.
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will prove crucial to the ability of our model to replicate the opposite volatility trends.
3.2.4 Strategy Choice of Listed Firms
At date 1, the shareholders of listed rms choose an optimal strategy sL, so as to maximize the date
2 stock price: sL  argmaxsi i taking the expected market pressure M as given. Omitting the index
i and considering (11) and (12), the FOC of this problem is given by:
C 0(sL) =
1
M
+ cov
"
U 0( ~RI)
EU 0( ~RI)
;
~A
M
#
(15)
At the optimum, the marginal cost equals the marginal gain of risk taking which can be decomposed
into an expected marginal gain corrected for the marginal increase in risk exposure. The interpretation
is thus similar to the private rm case (14) except that now idiosyncratic risk ed is completely diversied.
Combined with the denition of investors income ~RI ; equation (15) implicitly denes sL as a function
of market pressure M and number of investors I. In appendix A.3, we show that this problem admits
a unique interior solution and we establish the following partial equilibrium property:
Lemma 2 Risk Taking by listed rms sL is an increasing function of Stockmarket Participation I
There exists I0 such that, for all I > I0, Risk Taking by listed rms sL is unambiguously a
decreasing function of Market Pressure M .
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
In contrast to the case of private rms, it is not possible to show that sL is always decreasing inM ,
unless I is large enough. As for private rms there are three forces. First, a largerM reduces expected
marginal benet of risk taking; second, it also reduces risk exposure; third, it impacts investorsrisk
aversions but now in an ambiguous way. Indeed from the denition of ~RI it appears that a larger
M reduces nancial income but increases labor income because real wages benet from labor market
competition (see equations (8) and (12)). As a consequenceM has a contrasted impact on real income
and thus on risk aversion. As noticed in the entrepreneur case, this third e¤ect is crucial to establish
that s is decreasing in M . The overall impact is therefore ambiguous. However, for a large number
of investors I, the investor real income depends less on nancial income and is thus less exposed to
aggregate risk. This makes marginal utility constant across states of nature: the risk exposure term
in equation (15) shrinks to zero and only the expected marginal gain e¤ect remains signicant; this
tends to decrease the optimal sL. In the loglinearized version of the model in Section 4, we are be
able to drop the assumption I > I0.
The impact of I on sL follows from the previous discussion: larger I reduces risk exposure by
decreasing the share of nancial income in investor total income.
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3.3 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
The general equilibrium is the solution of a system of three equations:
Denition 1 The equilibrium consists of (M; sP ; sL) such that:
1. M depends positively on sL and sP through equation (9)
2. sP depends negatively on M , through equation (14)
3. sL depends negatively on M , through equation (15)
This is a rational expectation equilibrium. In period 1, each rm takes the expected M as given,
and sets up its optimal strategy choice. Given the above denition, the equilibrium value of market
pressure can be written as the solution to the xed point problem:
M =

L
N
 2
 1

1 +
NL
N
sL(M
( )
; I
(+)
) +
NP
N
:sP (M
( )
)
 2
 1
(16)
where sL and sP both decrease in M by virtue of Lemmas 1 and 2. The LHS of this equation
corresponds to the 45 line while the RHS is positive and decreasing inM as long as I > I0: hence the
equilibrium exists and is unique. From this simple expression, we easily get the following comparative
static properties:
Proposition 3 Assume I > I0. Then the equilibrium (M; sL; sP ) exists and is unique. And:
1. An increase in stock market participation I leads to an increase in market pressure M , an
increase in risk taking for listed rms, sL, and a decrease in risk taking for private rms, sP
2. An increase in the number of rms N leads to an increase in M and a decrease both in sL and
sP
3. An increase in market size L leads to a decrease in M and an increase both in sL and sP
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Let us begin with parts 2 and 3. An increase in the number of rms N increases market pressure
M which in turn tends to decrease risk taking for all rms. Market size L makes prots bigger; this
decreases market pressure M and increases risk taking for all rms. In the two cases, risk taking for
both categories of rms evolve in the same direction. The general intuition is straightforward: insofar
as competition or market size a¤ect both types of rm in the same fashion, they should, in equilibrium,
behave in the same way.
Part 1 of proposition 3 focuses on the e¤ect of stock market participation interpreted in our model
as an increase in the number of investors I. As I increases, this directly induces listed rms to increase
risk taking sL. This in turn tends to increase competitive pressureM : listed rms face now on average
higher demand, they exert more pressure on wages, and reduce prots for other rms. As an indirect
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consequence, private rms reduce their level of risk taking sP . This e¤ect is also there for listed rms,
but it is dominated by the direct e¤ect.
The above proposition thus suggests that increased stockmarket market participation, more than
competition or market size expansion, is a natural candidate to explain the divergence in volatility
trends. As it turns out, participation in the US has increased dramatically over the past decade, in
large part because of the development of mutual funds and individual retirement accounts such as
401k. For instance, Favilukis (2008) reports that the fraction of households owning stocks directly
or indirectly has risen from 33% to 43% between 1982 and 2004 (see also evidence from Guiso et al,
2003). In France, the number of shareowner has gone up from less than two millions in 1978 to more
than 6 million in 2006, most of the rise taking place during the mass privatization of the 1980s (NYSE
Euronext - SOFRES, 2007).
The above results are, however, obtained under the parameter restriction that I > I0. In addition,
it is not possible to obtain closed form solutions that would allow us to fully characterize the equilib-
rium, and derive more comparative static properties. This is why we approximate the model in the
following Section.
4 A closed form version of the model with small shocks
In this section we derive an approximated version of the model by assuming small aggregate and idio-
syncratic shocks: Beyond providing closed form solutions for the main endogenous variables (M; sL; sP ),
the benet of this approach is that it allows to derive additional results, in particular on international
risk sharing.
4.1 Loglinearization
Assuming small variations of ( eA,edi) around their means, we loglinearize the system around the de-
terministic equilibrium which corresponds to the special case where shocks take their mean value:eA = edi = 1. In the deterministic equilibrium, private and listed rms face similar incentives because
the risk adjustment terms in (14)-(15) are both equal to zero; and therefore they choose the same
strategy s0 which satises:
C 0(s0) = 1=M0 (17)
where market pressure M0 is given by equation (16):
M0 =

L
N ( 2)=( 1) (1 + s0)( 2)=( 1) (18)
Since C is convex, it is clear that there exists one and only one deterministic equilibrium (M0; s0)
which solves (17)-(18).
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In the stochastic equilibrium, for each variable x of our model, we denote x0 its value in the
deterministic equilibrium, and bx  (x   x0)=x0 its percentage deviation from x0. In Appendix B.2
we derive the rst order Taylor expansion of the equilibrium (sL, sP , M) as dened by equations
(14)-(15)-(16) where incomes ( ~RE ; ~RI) are given by (12)-(13). We obtain:
"C s^P =  M^   
P (19)
"C s^L =  M^   
L
M^ = m0

NL
N
s^L +
NP
N
s^P

where  is relative risk aversion, "C is the elasticity of marginal cost C 0 to s, m0  s0(   2)=(   1)
is a parameter capturing the elasticity of market pressure to risk taking, and (
P ,
L) are the risk
exposures of owners of private and listed rms:

P = E;A  2A + E;d  2d (20)

L = I;A  2A
where E;A  (1 + s0)=RE0M0 ; E;d  s0=RE0M0 ; I;A  (NL=I)(1 + s0)=RI0M0 .
The weights (E;A; E;d) correspond to the shares of entrepreneur income which are a¤ected by
the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shocks; the weight I;A is the share of investor income which is
a¤ected by the aggregate shocks. Implicitly we have I;d = 0 because investors are fully sheltered from
idiosyncratic risk. We also see that E;A > I;A: investors, who earn a deterministic labor income,
have a smaller exposure to aggregate shocks than entrepreneurs.
Looking at equations (19) and (20), a few interesting features emerge. First, the elasticities of bsL
and bsP to cM are similar: in the approximated equilibrium, the rst order impact of market pressure on
risk taking transits only through the expected marginal benet channel (see the discussion in section
(3.2.3) and (3.2.4)). Second, m0 can be interpreted as the strength of the general equilibrium feedback.
Third, both bsP and bsL are decreasing functions of risk exposures (
P ,
L) : a reduction in the share
of incomes that is exposed to risk generates a direct increase in risk taking.
Inverting the equilibrium system (19), we get the following closed form solutions:
s^P =

m0 + "C
:

 
P + m0
"C
NL
N
(
L   
P )

(21)
s^L =

m0 + "C
:

 
L + m0
"C
NP
N
(
P   
L)

(22)
M^ =   m0
m0 + "C
:

NP
N

P +
NL
N

L

(23)
where it appears that risk taking by private rms is a decreasing function of entrepreneurs risk
exposure, but an increasing function of investorsrisk exposures. This second e¤ect is channelized by
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the feedback e¤ect of market pressure on risk taking. This is how our model generates the pattern of
opposite trends in volatility for listed and private rms.
4.2 Stock Market Participation
This rst proposition summarizes the impact of an increase in stock market participation:
Proposition 4 A positive shock on stock market participation I :
1. increases market pressure, M , and risk taking by listed rms sL; but decreases risk taking by
private rms, sP .
2. increases the real wage and the utility of workers
3. decreases expected real prots for all rms and the utilities of investors and entrepreneurs
Proof. see Appendix B.4.
The rst point of proposition 4 is already established in proposition 3 except that now the result
does not hinge on a condition on I. Regarding points 2 and 3, we know from equation (8) that the
real wage is an increasing function of M^ . And closed form solution for expected prots is obtained by
linearizing expression (7):
E~L = E~P = 0   1 + s0
M0
:M^
where 0 is prot in the deterministic equilibrium. Since we compute a rst order approximation, the
envelope theorem applies and wipes out the terms in (s^P ; s^L): Hence the only equilibrium variable that
a¤ects expected prots is market pressure M^ . Stock market participation (or anything that increases
market pressure in our model) reduces real prots of both types of rms to the same extent. Using our
French data presented in Section 2, we draw in Figure 3 the evolution of the Return on Assets of the
two categories of rms:20 both groups exhibit the same downward trend, even though we saw earlier
that patterns of volatility diverge sharply. This conrms that intuition based on partial equilibrium
reasoning may be misleading. Even though listed rms take on more risk to increase their protability,
in general equilibrium, their ROA decreases.
A last outcome of interest is the equity premium. To this purpose we assume that there exists a
risk free security with a positive but very small exogenous return r such that investors real income,
~RI ; is still given by (12). In appendix B.3, we loglinearize the stock price (11) and nd the following
expression for the equity premium:
EP = r:I;A:E;A:
2
A (24)
20We compute ROA by dividing operating income through net assets. Such accounting variables are available from
our French dataset because the unit of observation is a rm, with its own nancial statement. This constrats with the
data exploited by Davis et al (2006), which is plant-level and therefore has no nancial statement.
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which is, through I;A, a decreasing function of stockmarket participation I : as more and more
investors can share the aggregate risk, the premium that stocks demand tends toward zero. Thus,
besides predicting a diverging pattern in rm volatility, our theory predicts that the equity premium
should have declined over the past thirty years so as to compel listed rms to take on more aggregate
and idiosyncratic risk. There exists such evidence, at least for the US. Using very di¤erent method-
ologies, Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) and Fama and French (2002) both conclude that the US equity
premium has declined by about 100 bp over the past decades.
4.3 The Great Moderation
It is a well established fact that aggregate volatility has declined signicantly in most developed coun-
tries over the past three decades (see Gali and Gambetti (2008) for a recent survey). The determinants
of this Great Moderationare still not clear: it could be luck, stabilizing monetary policy (Clarida
et al. (2000)) or improvements in inventory management (Kahn et al (2002)). As mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.2.1, our theory has no predictive power about size adjusted GDP volatility. Hence, we assume
hereafter that the decrease in aggregate volatility is exogenous and structural: in our model, this
corresponds to an exogenous decline in 2A:
Proposition 5 A negative shock on aggregate volatility 2A :
1. increases risk taking by private rms, sP , and market pressure, M
2. increases (resp. decreases) risk taking by listed rms, sL, if !M
1
 2
0 is su¢ ciently large (resp.
small).
3. decreases real prots and increases real wage.
Proof. see Appendix B.4.
The predicted e¤ect of a dampening of macroeconomic shocks di¤ers from the impact of stock
market participation. In our model, this tends to systematically increase risk taking by entrepreneurs,
which goes against the evidence presented in this paper and by Davis et al (2006). The e¤ect on listed
rms is, however, ambiguous. This comes from two conicting forces. First, equation (19) makes clear
that the direct e¤ect of a reduction in 2A is to increase risk taking by both listed and private rms.
Yet, because entrepreneurs are more exposed to aggregate risk than investors (E;A > I;A), private
rms increase their level of risk by more than listed rms21. Second, since all rms tend to increase
risk taking, the resulting increase in market pressure M results in higher wages, and lower expected
prots. This reduces incentives to take risk, by the same amount for listed and private held rms. On
balance, the rst e¤ect always dominates for private rms, but not always for listed ones.
21This is here a consequence of the assumption that NL < I: because there are more shareholders than listed rms,
the share of risky income for entrepreneurs is larger than what it is for investors.
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4.4 IPO Wave
In many developed countries, the fraction of the economy that is listed on the stockmarket has sig-
nicantly increased. For instance, Fama and French (2004) report that the number of new listings in
the US rose from 156 per year in the 1970s, to 549 per year in the 1980-2001 period: this rise in the
annual number of IPOs can be related to the creation of NASDAQ in the mid 1970s.22 In our model,
this can be interpreted as an increase in NL, holding N = NP +NL constant.
Proposition 6 A rise in the number of listed rms NL, holding the total number of rms N =
NL +NP constant:
1. decreases risk taking by listed rms, sL
2. has an ambiguous e¤ect on risk taking by private rms, sP , and market pressure, M
Proof. see Appendix B.4.
In our model, an IPO wave has the e¤ect of reducing risk taking by listed rms, which runs
opposite to available evidence from the US and France. There are two e¤ects. The rst, direct, e¤ect,
is that an increase in NL leads to a reduction in risk sharing, for investors only (
L increases, 
P
is una¤ected). This reduces risk taking in listed rms, while entrepreneurial rms do not change.
The second, general equilibrium, e¤ect comes through market pressure and is ambiguous: reduced
risk taking tends to dampen market pressure, but the increase in NL=N increases average risk taking
through a composition e¤ect as listed rms are riskier. Hence, the overall e¤ect on market pressure is
ambiguous. What proposition 6 demonstrates is that the rst e¤ect always dominates for listed rms.
5 The Globalization of Capital Markets
In the preceding analysis, we show that the opposite trends in rm volatility is due to the improvement
in risk sharing which follows, within our model, from an increase in stock market participation. Yet, an
increase in stock market participation does not increase risk sharing and reduce the equity premium in
all models. In practice, Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2003) recall that, since wealth is concentrated,
marginal shareholders tend to hold very small portfolios, and do therefore not contribute much to
global risk sharing.23 They even note that participation may increase the equity premium: lowering
22Similar reforms were undertaken in European countries, as with the creation of the Second Marché and the Nouveau
Marché in France, the Frankfurter Neue Markt in Germany, and the London AIM. These reforms had the e¤ect of
increasing the number of publicly held rms in the 1990s, albeit to a small extent. Taking a longer view, the picture
reverses itself in continental Europe. For instance, Bozio (2003) nds that the number of listed rms in France decreases
from about 30 per million inhabitants in the 1950s to only 15 in 2000.
23For instance, Kopczuk and Saez (2004) nd, using estate tax les, that the top 2% of the wealth distribution in the
US owns in 2000 more than 25% of aggregate wealth, and probably a larger fraction of outstanding corporate equity.
Given that, according to Guiso et al (2002), 93% of the households present in the top quartile of the wealth distribution
already own some equity, additional participation has to come from relatively poor households.
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participation costs for example will mechanically add investors that are less wealthy and more risk
averse than existing stockholders. Since the equity premium is determined by the preferences of the
marginal investors, it may very well increase.
In this Section, we consider a less controversial mechanism to the improvement in risk sharing:
capital markets integration. In a recent paper, Chari and Henry (2004) look at the e¤ect of stockmarket
liberalizations around the world. They nd that, on average, stock prices increase by about 15%. Part
of this increase can be explained by a straightforward decline in the risk free rate, reecting more
abundant capital in liberalized stock markets. But approximately two fth of it (6.8 percentage
points) is explained by the fact that domestic rmsstocks covariate much less with the world market
portfolio than with the domestic one (by a factor of 200!).
5.1 The Model With Two countries
We therefore expand the baseline model of Section 3 by considering a second, identical country (for-
eign). The world now has 2I investors, 2eL workers, 2NL listed rms (half of them domestic, half of
them foreign) and 2NP privately held rms. To clarify exposition, we assume that investors do not
supply labor.24 The number of goods is now 2N = 2NP + 2NL and we allow both countries to trade
goods; by assumption there are no trading costs. The only ex post di¤erence between the two countries
comes from the realization of their aggregate shock on labor supply. Labor supply is eLD = eAD:L in
the domestic country, and eLF = eAF :L in the foreign country. The shocks eAD and eAF are identically
distributed and assumed uncorrelated to simplify exposition (but this assumption is not necessary).
All the computational details are given in Appendix C.
Let us start with period 3. Product and labor markets clear and the prots of a domestic rm
operating on the world market is now given by:
~D;i =
eBD
M
:(1 + si: ~di)  C(si) (25)
where the subscript D is an index for domestic rms, and
eBD  eAD: 1
2
+
1
2
( eAF = eAD)( 1)=1=( 1)
This is very similar to the expression in a closed economy (equation (7)): the only di¤erence is the
term of trade e¤ect eAF = eAD which a¤ects domestic prots positively (see Coeurdacier (2008) for a
discussion). Following a positive relative supply shock in the domestic economy, domestic production
24 In this model with trade, real wages become random because of the terms-of-trade e¤ect. This makes computations
somewhat more cumbersome, although still feasible thanks to the linearisation. In particular, portfolio composition is
not symmetric anymore between domestic and foreign stocks, because domestic workers seek to hedge the terms-of-trade
e¤ect. We have veried that including labor income in investorsrevenues does not a¤ect our results (computations are
available from the authors upon request).
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and income expand; but foreign and domestic goods being imperfect substitutes, domestic demand
for foreign goods increases relatively more than foreign production; so the domestic terms of trade
decrease and so do prots.
The aggregate shocks ( eAD; eAF ) being identically distributed, the ex-ante strategy choice sL (resp. sP )
is similar for listed rms (resp. private) in both countries. As a consequence the equilibrium level of
market pressure is now given by:
M =

2L
(2N)
 2
 1

1 +
NL
N
sL +
NP
N
sP
 2
 1
Ad date 1, the optimal strategy choices are very close to those in closed economy (see sections
3.2.3 and 3.2.4). Entrepreneurs choose sP so as to maximize their expected utility:
C 0(sP ) =
1
M
+ cov
"
U 0( ~RD;E)
EU 0( ~RD;E)
;
eBD:edi
M
#
where ~RD;E = ~D;i is the income of domestic entrepreneurs at date 3.
And investors choose sL so as to maximize the stock price:
C 0(sL) =
1
M
+ cov
"
U 0( ~RI)
EU 0( ~RI)
;
eBD
M
#
(26)
where ~RI is the income of investors in period 3. ~RI depends on investorstrading opportunities in
date 2, which in turn depends on whether capital markets in the two countries are integrated or not.
5.2 Trade in Goods, No Asset Trade
As a benchmark, we look at the case where there is no trade in assets. Only domestic investors can
purchase domestic stocks, and domestic investors cannot purchase foreign stocks. The solution to
equation (26) is the same as in Section 3.2.4, at the di¤erence that now the aggregate shock is eBD
instead of eAD. After linearization around the deterministic equilibrium, the equilibrium equations inbsL; bsP ;M are identical to (19) except that risk exposures 
P and 
L are given by:

P = E;A:
2
B + E;d:
2
d (27)

L = I;A:
2
B
where 2B = [1 (2 1)=22]2A < 2A. Compared to the closed economy, international trade provides
some diversication via the terms of trade e¤ect, since the terms of trade tend to appreciate when
domestic productivity is low.
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5.3 Trade in Goods and Assets
We rst compute the stock price when investors can freely buy foreign stocks. Because aggregate
shocks are i.i.d., in equilibrium the representative investor holds half of her wealth in domestic stocks,
and half in foreign stocks. Hence, the investors income is given by:
~RI =
NL
I
" eBD + eBF
2
(1 + sL)
M
  C(sL)
#
Combined with equations (26) and linearizing around the deterministic equilibrium, the equilibrium
equations in bsL; bsP ;M are identical to (19) except that now risk exposures 
P and 
L are given by:

P = E;A:
2
B + E;d:
2
d (28)

L = I;A:
2B + D;F
2
where D;F is the covariance between trade adjusted country shocks eBD and eBF . Since these two
shocks are not perfectly correlated, it is easy to deduce that (2B + D;F )=2 < 
2
B.
Proposition 7 Capital market integration :
1. increases risk taking by listed rms, sL, and market pressure, M
2. decreases risk taking by private rms, sP
3. increases the real wage and the utility of workers
4. decreases real prots and the utilities of investors and entrepreneurs
The e¤ects at work are the same as for stock market participation. Capital market integration
enhances risk sharing among investors, which increases listed rms risk taking. Market pressure
increases and this reduces prots: this forces non listed rms to scale back on their risk taking.
5.4 Calibration
The change in size adjusted volatilities vP and vL that results from capital markets integration can
easily be computed by linearizing equation (10) and plugging it into expression (28). We obtain:
vL = ::v0
1
m0 + "C
:

1 +
NP
N
:
m0
"C

:I;A:
2B
2
:(1  ) (29)
vP =  ::v0 1
m0 + "C
:

1 +
NL
N
:
m0
"C

:I;A:
2B
2
:(1  )
where  is the correlation between eBD and eBF ; the parameter v0 is the size adjusted volatility as given
by equation (10) with s  s0, and  = [s0=(1 + s0)]

1   2A=v20.
From the above expression, it is clear that:
 vP
vL
=
"C=m0 +NL=N
"C=m0 +NP =N
(30)
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In the US, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) estimate that the market value of listed rms is
larger than the value of privately held ones. If this is the case, equation (30) predicts a decrease of
privately held rm volatility that is larger in magnitude than the observed increase in listed volatility.
This is consistent with evidence from Davis et al (2006): for instance, their Figure 5 reports an increase
in listed rm volatility by some 5 percentage points, along with a decrease of private rm volatility
by nearly 10 percentage points. The size of the divergence is smaller in France (see Section 2), which
is consistent with the fact that the share of listed equity in total corporate equity is only about 30%
in this country (Banque of France data allow to separate out listed and non listed equity).
To see whether improvement in risk sharing has a sizeable impact on rms risk taking, a simple
calibration exercise can be implemented on vL  vP . From equations (29), we obtain that:
vL  vP
v0
=

"C
::I;A:
2B
2
:(1  )
Regarding relative risk aversion we assume  = 4. From Imbs (2004), we take for aggregate volatility
2B = 0:25% (the mean standard deviation of GDP growth is 5% in his data) and for the mean
correlation across GDP growths we take  = 0:2. From the Federal Reserves Flows of Funds data, we
obtain that directly and indirectly held equities are approximately 30% of US householdsnet worth
(see Table B100e), so I;A = 30%. This leads to
vL  vP
v0
=
="C
1000
(31)
From these gures, it appears clearly that the cost function C needs to be almost linear (ie: the
elasticity "C~0) to ensure that (vL  vP ) =v0 responds signicantly to capital markets integration.
It is possible to roughly calibrate ="C using our microeconomic estimations (in section 2.3) where
we nd that a switch from "being closely held" to "being more widely heldhas on average a positive
impact on volatility of approximately 10%. In our theoretical model, such a switch corresponds to the
di¤erential of size adjusted volatility between listed and private rms: (vL   vP ) =v0 = 10%.
Linearizing (10) and taking M^ as given, this leads to:
vL   vP
v0
= : (bsL   bsP ) (32)
=

"C
::

E;d:
2
d + (E;A   I;A) :2A

Volatility increases because there is less exposure both to idiosyncratic risk and aggregate risk. From
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), we take E;d = E;A = 50%. As above we set I;A = 30%
and 2A = 0:5%. Last we assume that idiosyncratic risk has the same magnitude than aggregate risk
2d = 0:25% (though there is no easy way of calibrating this last parameter). From our empirical
estimates we know that (vL   vP ) =v0 = 10%. Together with (32) we deduce that:
="C ' 14 (33)
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Combining (31) and (33) this simple calibration exercise suggests that capital market integration,
in our model, should be responsible for a divergence in volatility by about 1.4% of the initial volatility.
This accounts for half of the divergence found in our French data (see Figure 2).
6 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the fact that volatility of listed and non listed rms have experienced
opposite trends over the past few decades. Our starting point, that we rst convincingly test on a panel
data of French rms, relies on the insight of the development literature: risk sharing among investors
should promote corporate risk taking. We extend existing models by (1) including a class of rms
that do not benet from risk sharing, and (2) modelling product market competition. We nd that an
increase in risk sharing, through capital market integration or rising stock market participation, can
generate opposite trends in volatility for private and listed rms. The model is also used to investigate
the impact of alternative determinants of rm volatility, such as an increase in product market size,
in the number of rms, in the fraction of listed rms or a decrease in aggregate volatility. All these
alternative comparative statics generate counterfactual trends in rm volatility.
We do not argue that there was no improvement in risk sharing among non listed rms owners.
The private equity market has been incredibly dynamic over the past 10 years (Kaplan and Stromberg,
2008): many rms that were family controlled are now owned by funds whose investors (institutions)
are well diversied. We believe that this movement is more recent than the liberalization of stock
market and capital market. But this is gathering strength as time goes by. Privately held rms may
indeed become riskier, possibly reversing the opposite trends that this paper seeks to explain. We
plan on studying these new developments in future research.
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Table 1: Sales Response to an Industry Shock and Ownership Concentration
log(Sales) log(Employment)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
log[salesst - -0.07 -0.41 - -0.06 -0.50
Known indiv. ownership > 50% (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.10)
log[salesst 0.09 0.05 0.10 -0.06 -0.12 -0.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Known individual - 1.31 11.02 - 1.06 12.93
ownership > 50% (0.24) (2.28) (0.25) (2.07)
log(salesi0) log[salesst No No Yes No No Yes
Industry log[salesst No No Yes No No Yes
Firm FE, Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 106,998 54,589 47,763 104,310 53,399 47,633
Source: Tax les and Financial relation survey (INSEE) over the 1984-1999 period. The dependant variable
is the logarithm of the rm sales in columns 1-3 and rm employment in columns 4-6. log[salesst stands for
industry-level sales, excluding rm i s own sales. In columns 3 and 6, the ownership concentration dummy is
rst regressed on rm log sales and 2 digit industry dummies. Then, the residual of this regression is interacted
with industry sales. Standard errors correct for observation level heteroskedasticity using the Whites method.
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Table 2: Ownership Concentration and Risk Taking
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Panel A: Dependent variable = Sales growth residual (100)
Direct ownership -1.7 -0.5 -0.5
of known individuals > 50% (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
log(sales) - - -1.8
(0.2)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes Yes
Observations 60,120 60,120 60,120
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Employment residual (100)
Direct ownership -0.5 -0.6 -0.6
of known individuals > 50% (0.1) (0.2) (0.2)
log(sales) - - -0.9
(0.1)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes Yes
Observations 58,184 58,184 58,184
Source: Tax les and Financial relation survey (INSEE) on 1984 - 2004. The dependent variable is obtained
through the following procedure. First, we run
Yit = i + POSTt + POSTt  Listedit + "it
where POST is equal 1 after 1990. Second, we take it= j"itj as our measure of volatility. In panel A, Yit is
the annual sales growth. In panel B, Yit is annual employment growth.
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A Proofs in the Benchmark Model
A.1 A Useful Lemma
We rst demonstrate a Lemma that will be used in most of the proofs of the baseline model
Lemma 8 Assume h( ~A; ed) is positive and strictly increasing in ~A and weakly increasing in ed.
Furthermore, assume that either (1) @f( ~A; ed)=@d = 0, or (2) f( ~A; ed) is such that there exists a
unique d( ~A) such that 0 = f( ~A; d( ~A)).
Last assume that @f( ~A; d)=@ ~A =  f(A; ~d)h (A; d) =A.
Then: E
h
f( ~A; ed)i = 0) E hh( ~A; ed) f( ~A; ed)i > 0
Proof. Assume rst that @f( ~A; ed)=@d 6= 0. By assumption, for each ~A:
~d  d( ~A)) f( ~A; ~d)  0
~d > d( ~A)) f( ~A; ~d) > 0
and since h( ~A; ~d) is decreasing in ~d, we can deduce that, 8 ~A,8<: ~d  d
( ~A)) f( ~A; ~d)h

~A; ~d)

 f( ~A; ~d)h( ~A; d( ~A)))
~d > d( ~A)) f( ~A; ~d)h

~A; ~d)

 f( ~A; ~d)h( ~A; d( ~A)))
As a consequence it is easy to see that, 8 ~A,:
E
h
f( ~A; ~d)h

~A; ~d

j ~A
i
 f^( ~A)h( ~A; d( ~A)) (34)
where f^( ~A)  E
h
f( ~A; ~d) j ~A
i
.
At this stage we need to show that there exists a unique A such that
~A  A () f^( ~A)  0 = f^(A)
At least one A exists, by virtue of the intermediate value theorem and the fact that, by assumption,
E
h
f^( eA)i = 0. This A is unique because f^ is locally increasing in ~A in A. To see why, we compute
the rst derivative of f^ :evaluated in A
df^
dA
(A) =
Z
@f(A; d)
@A
dGd =   1
A
Z
f(A; d)h (A; d) dGd
by assumption. Then:
df^
dA
(A)    1
A
"Z
dd(A)
f(A; d)h (A; d) dGd +
Z
~d>d(A)
f(A; d)h (A; d) dGd
#
   h

A
Z
f(A; ~d)dGd =   h

A
f^(A) = 0
where h  h(A; d(A)). As a consequence f^ is locally increasing function around A, thus A is
unique.
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Coming back to (34), the existence and unicity of A implies that:
~A  A ) f^( ~A)  0) f^( ~A):h( ~A; d( ~A))  f^( ~A)h
~A  A ) f^( ~A)  0) f^( ~A):h( ~A; d( ~A))  f^( ~A)h
Hence, we have an upper bound for E
h
f( ~A; ~d):h

~A; edi:
E
h
f( ~A; ~d)h

~A; edi 6 h:E hf^( ~A)i = h:E hf( ~A; ~d)i = 0
which proves the Lemma if @f( ~A; ed)=@d 6= 0.
If @f( ~A; ed)=@d = 0, the proof is the same, except that f^ = f so the rst part is irrelevant (until
equation (34)). QED
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The FOC (14) may be rewritten:
0 = E
"
U 0

~RE

:
 
~A: ~di
M
  C 0(sP )
!#
(35)
This maximization problem is well dened because the SOC of this problem is negative:
SOC  E
24 C 00(sP )U 0  ~RE+ ~A: ~di
M
  C 0(sP )
!2
U 00

~RE
35 < 0 (36)
Since C 0(0) = 0, the rst order derivative is strictly positive in sP = 0 and negative for large sP . This
ensures the existence of an interior solution.
Given the SOC, the rst derivative of sP w.r.t. M has the same sign as:
   C
0(sP )
M
EU 0

~RE

| {z }
<0
  
M
E
2666664U 0

~RE
 ~A: ~di
M
  C 0(sP )
!
| {z }
f( ~A;ed)
:
 
1
~RE
d ~RE
dM
!
| {z }
I( ~A;ed)
3777775
The rst component in  is negative. It is straightforward to show that f and I satisfy the conditions
required by Lemma 8. This proves the result.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Given that ~RI is not a¤ected by idiosyncratic risk, the FOC (15) may be rewritten as:
0 = E
"
U 0

~RI
 ~A:edi
M
  C 0(sL)
!#
(37)
the SOC of this problem is satised since C 00 > 0. Since C 0(0) = 0, the rst order derivative is strictly
positive in sL = 0 and negative for large sL. This ensures the existence of an interior solution. It also
ensures that prots are never negative: if they are in some states of nature, expected utility is equal
to  1. What ensures that it can be greater than  1 is that it is positive for sL = 0.
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Step 1.
We rst show that sL is increasing in I. Given the second order condition of this problem, it is
the case if and only if:

  @
@I
(
E
"
U 0

~RI
 ~A:edi
M
  C 0(sL)
!#)
> 0
rewriting 
 we nd:

 = E
2666664U 0

~RI
 ~A:edi
M
  C 0(sL)
!
| {z }
f( ~A)
:
 
  1
~RI
:
d ~RI
dI
!
| {z }
I( ~A)
3777775
It is easy to see that I( ~A) is positive and increasing in ~A. It is easy to see that f satsies the properties
required by Lemma 8. From the rst order condition, we know that Ef( ~A) = 0, which implies that

 > 0. This proves the rst point of Lemma 2.
Step 2.
We then look at the conditions under which sL is decreasing inM . Given the SOC of the problem,
it is the case if and only if:

    1
M2
E
h
U 0

~RI

: ~A
i
+ :E
"
U 0

~RI
 ~A:edi
M
  C 0(sL)
!
:f( eA)# < 0
is negative. Notice that:
f( eA) = 1
M
:
NL
I
:
0@ ~A:

1 + sedi
M
1A :
24!M 1 2 + NL
I
:
0@ ~A:

1 + si edi
M
  C(sL)
1A35 1
  1
   2 :
1
M
:!M
1
 2 :
24!M 1 2 + NL
I
:
0@ ~A:

1 + si edi
M
  C(sL)
1A35 1
as I goes to innity:
f( eA) =   1
   2 :
1
M
thus:

 =   1
M2
E
h
U 0

~RI

: ~A
i
  1
   2 :
1
M
E
h
I( eA)i
=   1
M2
E
h
U 0

~RI

: ~A
i
< 0
when I goes to innity. By continuity, there exists an I0 such that I > I0 ) 
 < 0 which proves the
proposition.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
First, notice that M is the solution of the xed point problem (16). Given Lemmas 2 and 1 hold, the
right hand side of (16) is decreasing in M . Hence, the equilibrium M is unique and can be thought of
as the intersection of the 45 line and the RHS of (16). We now prove the three points of Proposition
3.
1. When  increases, the RHS of equation (16) shifts up. This ensures that M increases. sP
depends on M only, so it decreases. If sL was also decreasing, then M would also increase which leads
to a contradiction: sL therefore increases.
2 and 3. Assume that N increases of L decreases: the RHS of (16) shifts upward. The equilibrium
M increases, which reduces both sP and sL.
B Linearising the Closed Economy Model
We loglinearize around their deterministic values the two Euler conditions (14)-(15) and the general
equilibrium equation (16).
B.1 Log Linearizing Euler Equations: The General Case
Both Euler conditions take the following form E
h
F (~;x)
i
= 0 where F (:) is di¤erentiable, x is the
vector of endogenous variables (sP ; sL;M); ~ is the stochastic vector ( ~A; ~d) which is distributed in the
neighborhood of its mean 0 = (1; 1): A second order-Taylor expansion of the Euler condition in ~
around 0 leads to:
0 = E
h
F (~;x)
i
' E
24F (0;x) +X
i
(~i   i;0)@F (0;x)
@~i
+
1
2
X
i;j
(~i   i;0)(~j   j;0)@
2F (0;x)
@~i@~j
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= F (0;x) +
X
i;j
i;j
2
@2F (0;x)
@~i@~j
where i;j corresponds at the variance-covariance terms. Then we develop at the rst-order only this
equation in x around x0 and we nd
0 = F (0;x0) +
X
k
(xk   xk;0)@F (0;x0)
@xk
+
X
i;j
i;j
2
@2F (0;x0)
@~i@~j
+
X
k
(xk   xk;0)i;j
2
@3F (0;x0)
@~i@~j@xk
In the previous equation the terms (xk   xk;0)i;j are dominated by the terms in (xk   xk;0) and i;j ,
so we can ignore them. This also justies why a rst order expansion in x is su¢ cient while a second
order expansion in ~ is necessary (Tille and Van Wincoop, 2007). Moreover from the deterministic
equilibrium FOC we get F (0;x0) = 0. This leads to the following approximated Euler equation:X
k
xk;0:x^k:F
0
xk
(0;x0) =  1
2
:
X
i;j
i;jF
00
~i~j
(0;x0) (38)
which also shows why the log deviation in equilibrium variables x^k are of the order of the variances
i;j (hence second order in the log deviation of e).
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B.2 Linearising Equilibrium Conditions (14)-(15)-(16)
Step 1.
We start with the Euler equation of privately held rms:
F (;x)  U 0
0@ ~A:

1 + sP : ~di

M
  C(sP )
1A : ~A: ~di
M
  C 0(sP )
!
By denition, 1=M0 C 0(s0) = 0 and RE;0 = (1+s0)=M0 C(s0). Hence the derivatives of F simplify
into:
F 0s(0;x0) =  C 00(s0):U 0 (RE;0)
F 0M (0;x0) =  
1
M20
:U 0 (RE;0)
and
F 00AA(0;x0) = 2:
1 + s0
M20
:U 00(RE;0)
F 00dd(0;x0) = 2:
s0
M20
:U 00(RE;0)
Using formula (38) and the fact that Ad = 0, we nd that:
U 0 (RE;0) :
 
C 00(s0):s0:bs+ cM
M0
!
=
U 00 (RE;0)
M0
:

1 + s0
M0
:2A +
s0
M0
:2d

given that C 0(s0) = 1=M0 and rearranging we nd:
"C :bs+ cM =  : 1
RE;0
:
1 + s0
M0
:2A +
1
RE;0
:
s0
M0
:2d

| {z }

P
with "C = C 00(s0):s0=C 0(s0).
Step 2.
The derivation of bsL is similar and we skip it to save space.
Step 3.
Equilibrium on the labor market is given by (16):
M0:

1 + cM = 
L
N
 2
 1

1 + s0 + s0
NL
N
bsL + s0NP
N
bsP 2 1
' 
L
N
 2
 1 : (1 + s0)
 2
 1| {z }
M0
:
26641 +    2   1 s01 + s0| {z }
m0

NL
N
bsL + NP
N
bsP
3775
which leads to the expression of cM in the text.
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B.3 Additional Equilibrium Variables
Step 1.
Expected prots of entrepreneurs are given by:
E~P =
1
M
(1 + sP )  C(sP )
' 1 + s0
M0
:

1  cM :1 + s0
1 + s0
bsP  C(s0)  C 0(s0)s0:bsP
' 0 + bsP :s0 1
M0
  C 0(s0)

| {z }
=0 by denition
  1 + s0
M0
:cM
which proves the result. The computation for E~L is identical:
Step 2.
The expected utility of entrepreneurs is given by:
EU (~P ) ' U (E~P ) + 1
2
:U 00 (E~P ) :V ~P
with:
~P ' 0   1 + s0
M0
:cM + 1 + s0
M0
: bA+ s0
M0
:bd+ s0
M0
: bA:bd
hence:
V ~P =

1 + s0
M0
2
2A +

s0
M0
2
:2d
Plugging V ~P and E~P back into the utility formula we get:
EU (~P ) ' U (0)  U 0 (0) 1 + s0
M0
:cM
 1
2
:U 00 (E~P ) :
"
1 + s0
M0
2
2A +

s0
M0
2
:2d
#
' U (0) :
24 1  (1  ) : 1RE;0 :1+s0M0 :cM
 12 (1  )

1
RE;0
:1+s0M0
2
:2A +

1
RE;0
: s0M0
2
:2d
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the di¤erentiation of the other expected utilities follows similar lines and we do not report them to
save space.
Step 3.
The equity premium is derived from the asset pricing condition (11):
 = E
h
U 0
 eRI :eLi
To x , we use the demand for safe asset:
 = E
h
U 0
 eRI :ri
37
hence, the equilibrium price is given by:
E
h
U 0
 eRI : (eL   r)i = 0
Given that the supply of safe asset is negligible, investors income is still given by:
eRI = !M 1 2 + NL
I
:
 eA: (1 + sL)
M
  C(sL)
!
' !M
1
 2
0 +
!
   2M
1
 2
0 :
cM + NL
I
:

0   1 + s0
M0
:cM + 1 + s0
M0
: bA
'

!M
1
 2
0 +
NL
I
:0

| {z }
RI;0
2666641  1RI;0 :

!
   2M
1
 2
0  
NL
I
:
1 + s0
M0

| {z }
 1
 2 I;W I;A
:cM + 1
RI;0
:
NL
I
:
1 + s0
M0
: bA
377775
Di¤erentiating the asset pricing condition:
0 ' E  U 0 (RI;0) + U 00 (RI;0) : (RI  RI;0) : (0:bL   r:0:b)
' E

1 + 

1
   2I;W   I;A

:cM   :I;A: bA : (0:bL   r:0:b)
' E

0:bL   r:0:b  I;A:1 + s0M0 : bA2

'  1 + s0
M0
:cM   r:0:b  I;A:1 + s0M0 2A
Hence
EP =
EeL   r

' 0
0
:bL   rb
' rI;A: 1
r0
:
1 + s0
M0
:2A
since 0 = r0. This proves the result reported in the text.
B.4 Comparative Statics in the Closed Economy
Step 1: Proof of proposition 4
This comparative static is sensible because the deterministic equilibrium (s0;s0;M0) is una¤ected
by . 
L is a decreasing function of I, since
I;A =
1
r + NLI :

1+s0
M0
  C(s0)
 :NL
I
:
1 + s0
M0

is decreasing in I, while 
P is una¤ected by changes in I. The rst two points of proposition 4 derive
from equations (22)-(21). From (23), market pressure increases, which raises the real hourly wage
given by (8). Results on prot and utilities follow.
38
Step 2: Proof of Proposition 5
The deterministic equilibrium is una¤ected by shifts in 2A. Since I;A < E;A, 
P   
L is an
increasing function of A. Hence, given that bsP depends on  
P and   (
P   
L), bsP is a decreasing
function of 2A. Written in terms of 
2
A, equation (22) rewrites:
s^L = :
m0
m0 + "C
:

E;A
m0
"C
:
NP
N
 

m0
"C
NP
N
+ 1

:I;A

2A +
m0
"C
NP
N
E;d:
2
d

the condition stated in the proposition ensures that the term in front of 2A is positive. Last, since cM
is a decreasing function of 
P and 
L, it is also decreasing in 2A.
Step 3 : Proof of Proposition 6
Again, the deterministic equilibrium is not a¤ected by shifts in NL, taking N as a constant.
I;A < E;A, which implie that 
P > 
L. Using expression (22), we can see deduce that bsL is an
increasing function of NP =N , hence decreasing in NL=N . Besides, NL makes 
L increase, hence makesbsL decrease. This proves the proposition.
C Resolution of the Open Economy Model
C.1 Computing Prots
In period 3, consumers can consume both domestic and foreign goods, without restriction. Let set:
c 
Z ecjdj
 
h

1=
D :
eL( 1)=D +1=F :eL( 1)=F i=( 1)
for c = D;F . Then, optimizing prots and writing down the labor market equilibrium, we nd that:
pc
P
=

   1 :
wc
P
ED + EF
P
= 
wc
P
=
   1

:

ceLc
1=
:1=
We solve the equilbrium by assuming that all listed rms in the domestic and foreign country
choose the same strategies sL for listed rms and sP for non listed rms. Implicitly, we are restricting
our analysis to symmetric equilibria. Under these conditions, the prot of rm i is given by equation
(25).
C.2 Financial Autarky
Under nancial autarky, sP and sL are given by the new rst order conditions:
0 = E
24U 0
0@ eBD:

1 + sP : ~di

M
  C(sP )
1A : eBD: ~di
M
  C 0(sP )
!35
0 = E
"
U 0
 
NL
I
:
 eBD: (1 + sL)
M
  C(sL)
!! eBD
M
  C 0(sL)
!#
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which is formally identical to the Euler conditions in the closed economy, except that the aggregate
shock is now eBD instead of eAD. Hence, the linearization of these conditions is identical. The only
di¤erence is that E eBD = 1 + (1=2   1=4):2A > 1 even though E eAD = 1 but the rst order term
vanishes in the Taylor expansion.
C.3 International Trade
The problem only changes for investors. In period 2, domestic investors now solve the following
optimization problem:
maxEU
Z
xiD;idi+
Z
xjF;jdj

s.t.
Z
xiD;idi+
Z
xjF;jdj < E
where E is their endowment: E = D:NL=I. Each domestic rms stock solves:
E
h
U 0
 eRI :D;ii = i
the equilibrium will be symmetric, so that all investors (domestic or foreign) will hold a fraction 1=2I
of each rm. Domestic and foreign rms will choose the same strategies. Hence,
eRI = NL
I
  eBD + eBF
2
!
:
(1 + sL)
M
  C(sL)
!
Maximizing i w.r.t. si amounts to solving:
E
"
U 0
 
NL
I
  eBD + eBF
2
!
:
(1 + sL)
M
  C(sL)
!!
:
 eBD
M
  C 0(sL)
!#
= 0
using formula (38) requires to compute the various derivatives:
F 0s(0;x0) =  C 00(s0):U 0 (RE;0)
F 0M (0;x0) =  
1
M20
:U 0 (RE;0)
and:
F 00DD(0;x0) = 0
F 00DB(0;x0) = 2
1 + s0
M20
:U 00(RE;0)
F 00BB(0;x0) = 0
hence the liearised FOC is given by
U 0 (RE;0) :
 
C 00(s0):s0:bsL + cM
M0
!
=
U 00 (RE;0)
M0
:

1 + s0
M0
:DB

which leads to the expression in the text.
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